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During its fifty-year history, the Urban League in Chicago, a legacy 
of World War I and the Negro migration, has had to adjust to wars, post-
war reconstructions, depressions and the social disorganization produced 
by racial violence; but none of these adjustments compared in depth and 
significance with that required during the hectic 1960 Ts. 
From its beginnings the Urban League movement has been considered 
the most conservative of the major organizations working in the field of 
race relations. The movement began around 1911 as an interracial organi-
zation in New York City, with the purpose of applying the methods and tech-
niques of social work to the problems facing Negroes in cities, especially 
the migrants from the rural South. Using the social work methods of 
research, community organization, education and negotiation, the League 
worked to open jobs for Negroes. At the same time, it helped in the adjust-
ment of Negro workers by teaching them proper work habits and modes of 
acceptable social behavior. During periods of racial cr is is , white power 
groups usually preferred to work through the Urban League in making small 
concessions to quiet Negro discontent. In the 1960Ts, however, Negroes 
began to repudiate both individuals and organizations which tried to play the 
accommodating role between the white power structure and the Negro com-
munity. 
In a letter to Arthur Kruse of the Community Fund of Metropolitan 
Chicago, Whitney M. Young, executive director of the National Urban League, 
epitomized the dilemma facing the Chicago League at this time. "The Urban 
League movement," Young wrote in 1962, "if it is to continue to be of se rv-
ice . . . , cannot close its eyes to the new and real revolution of expecta-
tion which has become internalized in practically every Negro citizen, and 
which has created an entirely different climate and mood. " He continued: 
For us to ignore this fact of life and not relate to it, while 
at the same time attempt to maintain the uniqueness and 
basic integrity of our program, would not only invite con-
tempt and disrespect, but — more tragic for Chicago and 
other communities — would result in the loss of leader-
ship to fanatic and irresponsible groups waiting to seize 
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any opportunity to exploit racial problems and convert 
now-tense situations into violent holocausts.2 
The Chicago League was faced with the problem of trying to maintain 
the confidence and respect of the Negro community by relating positively to 
the new movements astir in the city and by adjusting its programs and poli-
cies to make them relevant to the rapidly changing times without alienating 
important supporters and endangering its existence. This was the third 
time within two decades that the organization found it necessary to make 
such adjustments. During World War II, the agency lost support among 
Negroes when it seemed unable to keep up with the accelerated tempo of 
race relations fostered by the war. In 1946 the League's board of directors 
fired the executive director, Albon L. Foster, and two other top staff mem-
bers. . To replace Foster, Sidney Williams, who had a reputation for mili-
tancy, was employed to reorganize the League's operations and to reshape 
its image among Negroes. 3 
Williams succeeded too well in carrying out his mission. By the 
early 1950's the League was being attacked by pro-segregation groups, such 
as the White Circle League. Of greater significance, however, were the 
severe crit icisms leveled by Urban League supporters among conservative 
white business and professional groups. Finally, in November, 1954, the 
Community Fund, claiming that the League was causing it to lose contribu-
tions, threatened to drop the League as a member agency unless drastic 
changes were made in Urban League operations. Confronted with this ulti-
matum, the Chicago League, in July, 1955, released the executive director 
and all but two members of the staff and suspended operations for six 
months. During the interim, the agency formulated a new statement of pol-
icy, began a campaign to recruit more board members from among leading 
business and professional groups and employed a new executive director, 
Edwin C. Berry, who combined aggressiveness with diplomacy and admin-
istrative ability. "* 
The Chicago, League, with the improvements made in its operations 
between 1955 and 1960, was in a better position than most other local Urban 
Leagues to adjust to the 1960's. Nevertheless, any modifications had to be 
made with due regard to the constraints imposed by the agency's perennial 
concerns — especially fund raising — and by its relations with the Commu-
nity Fund and other groups and organizations in the city. Considering the 
internal and external difficulties involved, perhaps the crowning achieve-
ment of the Chicago Urban League in the I960's was its adjustment to the 
"Negro Revolution. " 
Revisions in programs and methods were neither initiated nor insti-
tuted in spectacular ways. Fortunately for the League, such an approach 
was not needed to gain the confidence of the Negro community, for it prob-
ably would have resulted in the loss of many white supporters. The fact 
that the agency was able to retain the confidence and respect of the Negro 
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community resulted from one of the paradoxes of the reorganization and 
rebuilding period. Actually, the. Chic ago League was largely conservative 
in orientation from 1955 to 1960; but Edwin C. Berry, as executive direc-
tor, managed to project a militant image for the agency, even while keeping 
his speeches and other pronouncements within the limits of rather conserv-
ative policies set by the board of directors. 
Often it was not what Berry said but the reaction to it that produced 
and sustained the reputation for militancy. In 1957, for instance, speaking 
to fellow officials at the National Urban League's conference in Detroit-
Berry characterized Chicago as the most segregated large city in the United 
States. This speech drew an immediate rebuttal from Mayor Richard Daley 
and a critical editorial from the Chicago Tribune. The editor of the Chicago 
Daily Defender, however, expressed the general reaction of the Negro com-
munity when he asserted: "Mr. Berry did not exaggerate a bit when he cr i t -
icized Chicago. In fact, he was too restrained, too mild in his description 
of the evil forces at work in this metropolis."5 Several weeks later, Berry 
told the board of directors that requests for staff members "to speak, con-
sult and counsel with all types of community groups have more than doubled 
since the Tribune editorial over any comparable period during the existence 
of the reorganized Chicago Urban League. "^ The repetition of such inci-
dents, along with actual accomplishments, facilitated the retention of Negro 
support. 
In interpreting and justifying increasingly aggressive activities to 
somewhat conservative white supporters, there were two effective proce-
dures available. On the one hand, it could be pointed out that the League 
could not accomplish anything without Negro support. This argument was 
included in the board of director 's reply to the cri t icisms following the 
Detroit speech. A statement released by board president Nathaniel O. 
Calloway declared that the Negro citizens of Chicago "look to the Urban 
League to reveal the truth, without fear or favor." Furthermore, "those 
who would like to see the Chicago Urban League become docile and subser-
vient should realize that such an Urban League would be worthless, even to 
themselves ." 7 The second technique for justifying more militant actions 
was to place them within the context of accepted Urban League procedures,' 
in other words, to maintain that what the agency was doing was in keeping 
with time-honored policies and methods of the Urban League movement. 
The two techniques were supplementary and mutually reinforcing. 
Although the process of adjustment accelerated in tempo during the 
1960's, it was still gradual and rather subtle. As long as a favorable image 
could be maintained among the agency's diverse constituency, Urban League 
leaders preferred that publicity center on programs and accomplishments, 
rather than on internal adjustments. Moreover, the more permissive c l i -
mate in race relations which accompanied the "Negro Revolution" made 
many aggressive Urban League actions seem relatively moderate. 
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Then, too, adjustment involved much more than questions of militancy 
and moderation. The growing intensity of the struggle for Negro equality 
poignantly highlighted the complexity and interrelatedness of the multiple 
bar r ie r s facing Negroes in Chicago and other cities throughout the country. 
Negro leaders came to realize that the breaching of one barr ier in the 
vicious circle of segregation and discrimination might have little effect on 
the NegroTs general plight. It was long recognized that housing was a key 
issue, but open occupancy, without improvement in other areas, would not 
benefit those most in need of better housing. Without jobs Negroes living in 
slums could not escape, even if given the opportunity. Conversely, improved 
economic conditions would not necessarily bring better housing. The ability 
to take advantage of employment opportunities, moreover, required levels 
of education and training not being reached by children in the largely segre-
gated schools in Negro ghettos. In addition, complacency and resignation, 
born of family disorganization and poverty, stood as ba r r i e r s to taking 
advantage of even the educational opportunities available. 
Under such conditions, piecemeal attacks on less sensitive points and 
a few grudging concessions would not satisfy the Negro's cry for "freedom 
now. " The tremendous r i se in Negro expectation and the demands made on 
Negro leadership to bring fulfillment of these expectations became sources 
of bewilderment for many whites and sources of great challenge to Negro 
leaders. Samuel Lubell, in his book White and Black: Test of a Nation, 
voiced this white bewilderment when he stated: 
Currently the more militant Negro leadership seems 
bent on transforming the whole country into one national 
arena of this struggle. By stirring tensions at enough 
points of society, these militants appear determined to 
involve each of us ever more deeply in their grievances, 
to leave us no escape from their clamors for "freedom 
now, ,f no place to hide from taking sides . . . . 8 
The most common expression of this bewilderment, however, was the often-
repeated question: "What do the Negroes really want?" 
The challenge to Negro leadership was twofold. In the first place, 
they had to continue and redouble their efforts to open the gates of opportu-
nity. On the other hand, they had come to realize that opportunity alone was 
not enough. Negroes had to be able to take advantage of opportunities made 
available to them. Edwin C. Berry lamented in 1963 that "if full freedom 
came today — equality of opportunity — Negroes would not have one more 
job, one more good house, one whit more education than they had the day 
before it came. "9 Berry and other Urban League leaders, along with the 
leaders of other organizations, realized that in large measure this called 
for work beyond boycotts, picket lines and demonstrations. These were 
important, but the next step was for Negroes to prepare themselves through 
Urban League Adjustments to the "Negro Revolution" 7 
education, training and stable families to enter the mainstream of Amer i -
can life. 
Leaders of the Chicago Urban League accepted both of these chal-
lenges, but the major emphasis of Urban League programing, as it had been 
traditionally, would be in working beyond the picket line. League officials 
felt that their agency was uniquely qualified to carry the message of the 
second step to the Negro community and to secure white cooperation, espe-
cially that of business and industrial leaders, in reaching program goals in 
this area. 
The greater efficiency and flexibility in administrative organization 
instituted after 1956 facilitated adjusting Urban League programs to meet 
the demands of the "Negro Revolution. " The pre-1956 programing depart-
ments — industrial relations, public education (public relations) and com-
munity organization — were reorganized and renamed. Only the research 
department retained its old title. The employment and guidance, community 
education and community services departments had broader responsibilities 
and were more flexible in approach than their antecedents. Although each 
department concentrated primarily on programs within its own area, unified 
projects and shifts in emphasis took place without severe disruption of rou-
tine functions. 
The reorganized departments received their first real test in 1961 
when the employment and guidance department worked with the other 
departments to get fair employment (F. E. P. ) legislation through the Illi-
nois General Assembly. After fourteen years of failure, success finally 
came in 1961. The Urban League employed its full complement of tactics to 
help achieve this victory in the war against discrimination in employment. 
Over the years, .there had been many individuals and groups working sepa-
rately and conjointly for a F. E. P. law in Illinois, and they all contributed 
in varying degrees to the final result . Nevertheless, Urban League activi-
ties were such in 1961 that Berry could boast that "the Urban League made 
the difference." 
The publicized aspects of the League's work and most of its covert 
activities adhered closely to traditional methods. In December, 1960, the 
Urban League board unanimously reaffirmed the agency's unequivocal stand 
in favor of fair employment practices and pledged a continuation of " r e -
search, educational, organizational, and cooperative activities" leading to 
the passage and acceptance of a F. E. P. l aw. 1 0 Now the departments could 
launch programs within the limits prescribed by this resolution. Research 
furnished the "facts and figures" for testimony before legislative commit-
tees and for use in mobilizing community groups. The community services 
department had the task of working with and through organizations of all 
types throughout the state to marshal public suppor t . 1 1 Berry described 
this work as follows: 
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We did all the regular things involved in community 
organization — we visited groups and leaders — we pro-
vided them with educational materials and know-how in 
planning and programming — we exploited mass media 
always playing up the contribution of others. We studied 
the pressure points - - w e made sure that the constellation 
of supporting agencies and groups gave expression of 
approval to the legislative supporters of F. E. P. . . . and 
that they worked with those in the Senate who had to be 
convinced if we were to win . 1 2 
The culmination of what Berry termed the "public and flamboyant" 
part of the League's program was a leadership conference sponsored by the 
employment and guidance department. Some 1, 000 representatives of 400 
different organizations met at Dunbar High School on February 25, 1961. 
They listened to speakers explain the need for and the purpose of F . E. P. 
legislation, describe the provisions of the bill to be introduced in the legis-
lature and exhort them as to what they and their organizations could do to 
promote passage of the bill. The representatives also spent an hour in 
workshop sessions discussing specific ways to help in the campaign. ^ 
Commenting editorially on the conference, the editor of the Daily Defender 
declared that it had succeeded in "inoculating the people against the perni-
cious fallacy of indecision and inaction. " Furthermore, the Chicago Urban 
League had demonstrated "with conviction that the people of this community 
are ready for constructive and effective action. " ^ 
Once people had been motivated to act, some organization needed to 
coordinate their activities and bring pressure to bear where it would count 
— on members of the General Assembly. The Urban League could not, how-
ever, perform this function. By policy and because of the danger of losing 
its tax-exempt status, the League was prohibited from lobbying on legisla-
tive matters . This did not prevent the League and its individual officials 
and board members from cooperating with organizations that did lobby. 
Such an organization, the Illinois Committee for Fair Employment Prac-
tices, had existed for some time. Professor James Q. Wilson found, how-
ever, that it had been hampered in the 1940!s and most of the 1950Ts by dis-
unity among Negro organizations; lack of financial support from Negroes; 
and some rivalry "between the state NAACP conference and white groups as 
to which should organize the FEPC campaign. " 1 5 
After 1959 the Chicago Urban League was in a better position to help 
infuse new life into the Illinois Committee, and the NAACP had also become 
stronger and more stable by this t i m e . 1 6 During the 1961 campaign, the 
Urban League worked actively with the Illinois Committee. Richard J. Nel-
son, manager of the civic affairs division of Inland Steel Corporation, served 
as its chairman; League president Joseph H. Evans was secretary, and 
League vice president Hugo B. Law was chairman of the public relations 
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committee. x ' The Committee did a good job of mobilizing support for the 
bill. 
Yet, in the final analysis, the fate of the measure depended on whether 
or not enough Republican votes could be obtained to get it through the sen-
ate. In the fifty-eight member senate — consisting of thirty-one Republi-
cans and twenty-seven Democrats — thirty votes were needed to pass the 
bill. The Illinois Committee felt that twenty-five, or possibly twenty-six, 
Democrats could be counted on to vote for passage. Only one Republican, 
however, had voted for F. E. P. in 1959. Of seven new Republican senators, 
the positions of six were uncertain, but three had indicated that they might 
be persuaded to vote favorably. The big job, then, was to secure at least 
four additional votes — most of which would have to be Republican — while 
holding those already favorably disposed toward F . E. P. -^ 
The Urban League did not rely on the "public and flamboyant" aspect 
of the program to sway these votes. As Berry said: "Something else was 
going on quietly and behind the facade of articulation and public demonstra-
tion. " Members of the League's board worked to bring personal and organ-
izational influence to bear on Republican senators. 
The agency claimed major credit for two rather significant develop-
ments resulting from this tactic. By mid-April the Chicago Association of 
Commerce and Industry had passed a resolution endorsing F. E. P. legisla-
tion in principle, and the Association's staff was instructed to frame recom-
mendations for amending the bill then before the senate. Urban League 
board member Frank H. Cassell of Inland Steel was credited with spear-
heading the procedure which led to the Association's unprecedented resolu-
tion. He was backed by other League board members and other sympathetic 
Association members from various Chicago f i r m s . 1 9 
Urban League officials also felt that they had been instrumental in 
helping to transform F. E. P. into a bipartisan issue. For years F . E. P. in 
Illinois had been considered a Democratic measure. Consequently, it 
always passed the house, usually controlled by Democrats, and was always 
killed in the Republican-controlled senate. In 1961 there were indications 
that some Republicans were beginning to accept F . E. P . , at least in pr inci-
ple. Symbolic of this changing opinion was a "surprise appearance" before 
the senate by Charles Percy to testify in favor of F . E. P. legislation. 
League board members had conferred with Percy and other Republican 
leaders, and they claimed credit for helping persuade him to test i fy . 2 0 
After the bill had been enacted into law, signed by the governor, and 
a commission appointed to administer it, the League's executive director 
summed up the Urban League's view of its contribution to the successful 
campaign. Berry exclaimed: 
It was a great victory — a bipartisan victory, with 
the Urban League working with and on all sides of the bat-
tle without agency identification with either political party 
10 Midcontinent American Studies Journal 
— without lobbying, but always recognizing, stimulating 
and complimenting the contributions of all individuals and 
groups willing to h e l p . 2 1 
The F. E. P . law, coming during a period of changing national senti-
ment, eventually had a great impact on the League's work in employment 
and guidance. After 1956 the Chicago League abandoned its attempt to oper-
ate a mass placement office and concentrated its efforts on trying to break 
patterns of discrimination. Dramatic accomplishments were few in the 
1950's. By 1963, however, the impact of the civil rights movement, of 
Executive Orders by Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson and 
of the Illinois F. E. P. statute began to open opportunities to Negroes with 
the requisite skills and training. In fact, requests for well-trained Negroes 
came faster than qualified people could be found. "The young, well-trained 
Negro," Berry wrote in 1964, "now has a chance to get into the mainstream 
of American economic life." The League's employment and guidance staff 
members were having trouble meeting the demands made on them. 
They are under pressure to provide the "instant Negro." 
The employer names the job specifications for which he 
wants a Negro and we are supposed to produce one to fill 
the spot with the same magic as producing a genii out of a 
bot t le . 2 2 
With so many businesses searching for talented "token Negroes" to show 
Federal officials that their firms did not discriminate, comedian Dick 
Gregory wondered if the well-known automobile rental company might not 
soon open a "Hertz-Rent-a-Negro" agency. 
The humor of the situation was rather sardonic, for Negroes still 
comprised the largest percentage of the unemployed and still overloaded the 
welfare rol ls . Yet it was encouraging to see more talented Negroes finally 
getting jobs commensurate with their training and abilities. But what about 
the unskilled, the inadequately trained and the Negro with only average ta l-
ents ? While the Urban League was helping push the talented through the 
opening gates of opportunity, it also needed to be concerned about those who 
could not even reach the threshold. 
In late 1962, the League began an experimental job-training program 
to aid unskilled welfare rec ip ients . 2 3 The special job training project 
began as a cooperative venture with the Yellow Cab Company and the Cook 
County Department of Public Aid. A short training course was established 
to train welfare recipients as taxi cab drivers. Those who completed the 
course were employed by the Yellow Cab Company. These men became 
self-supporting and thus were removed from the welfare rol ls . 2^ A similar 
project was begun with the Shell Oil Company to train gas station attendants. 
By June, 1964, the Yellow Cab Company and Shell Oil Company had hired 
1, 270 men off the relief r o l l s . 2 5 
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The first major call for Urban League assistance in implementing a 
fair employment program came from Chicago banks. In August, 1963, 
James Baxter, a Fi rs t National Bank of Chicago vice president, arranged 
for Berry and two staff members to meet with the bankTs personnel offi-
cials. These bank officers said that they wanted to open all jobs Mfrom the 
beginning to management trainees" and asked the League to find qualified 
people to fill the openings.2 6 Shortly after the conference at the Fi rs t 
National Bank, five large commercial banks asked the League to screen 
applicants for them. During 1963 other firms called for assistance in 
implementing equal job opportunities programs, and the Association of 
Commerce and Industry began to encourage its members to institute such 
programs. 
Several of the firms seeking Negro employees realized that the League 
could not supply "instant Negroes." The president of the Harr i s Trust 
Company, for example, asked the Urban League staff to ass is t with the 
f irm's "pre-training program" for bank employees. Harris Trust planned 
to place promising young people in this training program, pay them a small 
stipend while in training and assure them a job upon successful completion 
of the c o u r s e . 2 7 
In the general field of community services, the principal areas of 
League concern were housing, racial violence and the schools. It had been 
recognized for some time that discrimination in housing was a key bar r ie r 
to integration in other areas . Moreover, much of Chicago's racial violence 
over the years had its roots in housing segregation. Given the significance 
of housing, it would seem" that discrimination in this area would have been a 
major target of Negro protest. Housing, however, became a subordinate 
issue to employment and schools in the I960's. 
There were probably several reasons for this. In the first place, 
white resistance remained strongest against efforts to integrate neighbor-
hoods. Real estate interests and other influential groups with vested inter-
est in a dual housing market threw their considerable weight against 
integration. Another factor was the divided sentiment within the Negro 
community. James Wilson reported Negro politicians, for example, re luc-
tant to embrace open occupancy. The dispersal of the Negro population 
would destroy their source of political s t rength . 2 8 In addition, integrated 
housing, as opposed to better housing, had come to be considered as largely 
a middle-class goal. The Chicago Commission on Human Relations con-
cluded from a 1963 survey of states with fair housing laws that "the demand 
to own, rent, lease, or co-op by Negroes outside established neighborhoods 
comes chiefly from middle-income families. " 2 9 
This does not mean that discrimination in housing was not an impor-
tant area of protest. The Chicago Urban League, however, devoted a com-
paratively minor proportion of its resources to this problem. But in many 
respects, the agency's fair housing program was a replica in miniature of 
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its fair employment activities. The board of directors made a formal p ro -
gram possible by adopting a housing policy statement in early 1960. Never-
theless, some board members seemed somewhat reticent for the agency to 
become too closely identified with this issue. 3° 
Even so, the League's housing activities were rather varied. During 
each legislative session, a staff member testified in favor of fair housing 
legislation. Urban League testimony, citing statistics, usually emphasized 
the causes of segregation and its baneful social and economic conse-
quences . 3 1 Beginning in 1960 the League worked through the United Citi-
zens1 Committee for Freedom of Residence (FOR) to get an open occupancy 
bill through the legislature. By 1965 the fair housing campaign was gaining 
momentum, and the League was an active participant. It was hoped that 
this would be the year that an open occupancy bill would be enacted into law. 
In spite of the more intensive campaign, culminating in a demonstration on 
the steps of the capitol in Springfield, the General Assembly failed to pass 
a fair housing law. 
Between 1960 and the summer of 1965, League efforts to reduce racial 
violence were supplementary to the work of many other public and private 
agencies. The Urban League's program concentrated mainly on working for 
effective police action and on arousing the public to an awareness of the 
potential danger. The League's Council of Religious Leaders was active in 
both of these areas . Composed of seventy ministers, priests and rabbis in 
1960, the Council almost doubled in membership by 1965. Council members 
exhorted the members of their congregations to work to relieve tensions; 
and where violence broke out or threatened to break out, they went in to 
work with the people of the areas involved and to act as observers of police 
practices. These activities heralded the increasing participation of re l i -
gious leaders, as individuals and as members of organized groups, in the 
campaign for improved race relations in the city. 
The Urban League also helped to break through the newspaper curtain 
thrown around incidents of racial violence. Immediately after the race riot 
of 1919, the press adopted a policy of not publicizing incidents of racial vio-
lence. It was felt that the absence of publicity would keep small disturb-
ances from spreading and from inciting more generalized rioting. Radio 
and television embraced this policy and helped to maintain the "barrier of 
si lence." Ordinarily, this seemed to be a sound policy, but as tensions 
increased, League officials felt that public opinion should be brought to bear 
as a deterrent to perpetrators of mob violence. With the mass media silent, 
however, the general public, League officials maintained, was probably 
unaware of the prevalence of racial, incidents and of how great the potential 
was for large-scale conflict. 
As a means of alerting the public to the danger, Hugo B. Law — an 
advertising executive and Urban League vice president — and Edwin Berry 
proposed that the League sponsor a newspaper advertisement. The League 
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board endorsed the project in July, 1961. The success of the plan depended 
upon the League's ability to involve the major religious organizations and to 
solicit "various leaders in all levels of the community" as s ignators . 3^ 
Representatives of several religious groups endorsed and supported the 
project. These included officers or staff members from the Church Feder-
ation of Greater Chicago, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the 
Catholic Interracial Council, the Chicago Board of Rabbis and the Depart-
ment of Christian Social Relations of the Episcopal Diocese of Chicago. 
When the advertisement, entitled a "Chicago Declaration of Democ-
racy, " appeared, it was signed by 404 "prominent Chicagoans. " 3 3 In 
assessing the effects of the project, Berry reported: "The drama of the ad 
attracted so much attention and was written on so widely, and interracial 
violence was so sharply reduced that the agreement of silence regarding 
news on violence was broken and I believe shall not be reinstated in Chi-
cago . " 3 4 
During the school year 1961-1962, school problems began to over-
shadow other race relations issues. The prolonged controversy over condi-
tions in Chicago schools was much too complex to be detailed here. Urban 
League involvement in the early stages of this struggle, however, was quite 
significant, and as the conflict continued, it became necessary for the 
League to define rather clearly its relationship to the activist civil rights 
organizations. 
For decades Chicago had operated double shifts in some schools. 
This practice began during the depression, and afterwards the city was not 
able to build facilities fast enough to house its rapidly growing school popu-
lation. Between 1930 and 1940, however, few Negroes were affected by the 
double shift arrangement. But during the next two decades, double shift 
schools soon became characteristic of Negro areas . By 1961 nearly all 
schools on split shifts served Negro neighborhoods.35 Furthermore, there 
was little doubt that schools in Negro areas were attended almost exclu-
sively by Negro children, and schools in white neighborhoods were attended 
by white children. Although some schools were considered integrated, a 
decreasing percentage of Chicago children attended such schools, and many 
so-called integrated schools were actually becoming segregated, or - - to 
use the common euphemism — were in transition from predominantly white 
to predominantly Negro 
The fact that segregation existed, as Negro organizations were con-
tending with increasing vigor, was shown by the Board of Education^ racial 
headcount in October, 1963, and confirmed by the Advisory Panel on Inte-
gration of the Public Schools, the Hauser Panel, under the chairmanship of 
Philip M. Hauser of the University of Chicago. The PanePs report stated 
bluntly: "Negro children and teachers and other staff in the Chicago Public 
School System are, by and large, concentrated in predominantly Negro 
areas in the c i ty . " 3 " The Hauser Panel denied, however, that this segre-
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gation resulted from nintent or design" on the part of the Board of Educa-
tion. Rather, it was a "by-product of segregated patterns of settlement and 
housing," which was, in turn, a "product of forces built deep into the social, 
economic, and political fabric of the nation. "3? 
The creation of the Hauser Panel and the approval in principle of its 
findings and recommendations by the Board of Education was, perhaps, the 
only major concession made to the civil rights movement. And this was 
only a very small first step, which had come after two years of protest and 
would be followed by more. Between 1962 and 1965 those seeking to inte-
grate the schools used litigation, sit-ins, marches, city-wide boycotts and 
appeals to the federal government to achieve their end. A multiplicity of 
organizations have been involved, and the activities of first one then another 
have come to the fore. 
The Chicago Urban League made its most significant contribution 
during the early stages of the controversy. The League was instrumental 
in bringing the schools issue to the fore by helping to foment unrest in the 
Negro community over the quality of education offered in the schools. For 
some time, the agency had been directing its research toward exploring and 
publicizing conditions in the schools. Materials gathered by the research 
department were used, from time to time, in presenting testimony at Board 
of Education hearings and for public education activities. Principal stimu-
lation for the protest movement came, however, in September, 1961, when 
a group of Negro parents filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois against the Chicago Board of Education and 
the general superintendent of schools. The plaintiffs in Webb v. The Board 
of Education charged that a deliberate policy of segregation was followed by 
school officials in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and asked for 
injunctive relief for themselves and others similarly situated. The court 
dismissed the case in 1962, on the grounds that state remedies had not been 
exhausted, but soon various organizations were launching militant cam-
paigns for school integration.3 8 
One of the first demands of these groups was that the Board of Educa-
tion end double shifts in Negro schools by transferring Negro children to 
white schools with unused space. Since the general superintendents office 
no longer made official reports on vacant space, it was difficult to get re l i -
able information on space use. Different organizations made estimates of 
available space in white schools ranging from 25,000 to 75,000 seats. At 
the beginning of the 1961-1962 school year, several Negro parents tried to 
enroll their children at schools which reportedly had vacant seats. 39 
In the meantime, Urban League investigators were at work. On 
December 12, 1961, Mrs. Olivia Filerman reported to the League's board 
of directors that the research department had made disturbing findings on 
classroom utilization, and these findings were disclosed in a report to be 
released on that day. Urban League research had shown 382 classrooms 
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not reported by Superintendent Benjamin Willis as being vacant. Conse-
quently, unused rooms were "available for use by Negro students on double-
shift and in overcrowded c lassrooms." "These rooms , " Mrs . Filerman 
asserted, "could be used to completely eliminate double shifts tomorrow, if 
the school board decided to put them to this use. " Moreover, many schools 
with vacant classrooms were found to be within walking distance of Negro 
students on double shi f t s . 4 0 
The Urban League's report provided documented information for the 
growing number of parents and organizations evincing a determination to 
press for changes in the schools. Since the LeagueTs study was the result 
of careful research, done by a reputable organization and based on availa-
ble Board of Education figures, it could not be ignored by school officials. 
The report provoked a year-long controversy over school space use. Dur-
ing this period, according to the investigator for the United States Civil 
Rights Commission, "the public was treated to a statistical display of p ro-
digious and bewildering proportions." The general superintendent issued 
replies to the League1 s study on December 18, 1961, and on January 10, 
1962. Both statements were unconvincing to school cr i t ics . Berry summed 
up the status of the controversy in mid-January, when he reported to the 
League's board of directors that: 
Mr. Willis plays a "numbers game" — since Sep-
tember he has stated at different times that there a re the 
following number of vacant or available classrooms: 1 -
14 - 143 - 198 — last, Oscar Shabat, Schools Director of 
Human Relations came up with the figure of 200. 
In various reports the Superintendent changes fig-
ures , definitions and usage — sometimes he talks of 
available classrooms, sometimes number of seats — 
sometimes total classrooms and other times regular 
classrooms, et al. No one has gotten this information 
accurately reported and in a standard way — not even his 
employers, the School Boa rd . 4 1 
Neither the Board of Education nor the general superintendent made any 
efforts of consequence toward meeting the demand for better space utiliza-
tion, and the civil rights organizations turned to more aggressive methods 
of dramatizing Negro grievances. 
The growing militance of the civil rights movement in Chicago placed 
the Urban League in something of a dilemma. It could not actively part ici-
pate in direct action demonstrations, for of all the major organizations par-
ticipating in the school protest movement, the League was most susceptible 
to pressures from defenders of the status quo. With the greater portion of 
the agency's budget coming from the Community Fund and business and 
industrial groups, a threat to withdraw support had usually been sufficient 
to hold the League in line. Conservative criticism of the Urban League's 
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role in the schools controversy caused the Community Fund to call the 
agency to task in 1962, but with the changed climate of opinion which p re -
vailed on race relations in the 1960's, the League could not be forced to 
make drastic changes in its programs as concessions to conservative 
demands.4 2 These groups were unwilling to exert enough pressure to force 
such changes. They did not want their criticisms of the Urban League to be 
interpreted as opposition to the Negro1 s valid aspirations, and they still 
considered the League relatively "safe and sane. M For in spite of its new 
militancy, it was still several steps behind the direct action organizations. 
Although the Urban League could not afford to ignore the opinions of 
its business and industrial constituency, it also had to be concerned about 
its relations with the direct action organizations. These groups were 
expressing the dominant Negro mood, and not to be identified with them 
would place the League outside of the civil rights movement. Furthermore, 
since the Urban League could not adopt activist tactics, in order to serve 
the civil rights movement in areas where it considered itself uniquely com-
petent, the League had to be accepted by the direct action groups. In most 
cities with Urban League branches such a working relationship could not be 
established. The activists usually dismissed Urban Leagues as nUncle 
Tom1' organizations catering to the demands of the "power structure.T,^3 
The Chicago branch, however, was in a more favorable position. The 
militant image being projected by 1960 enabled it to establish a working 
relationship with the direct action organizations during the early stages of 
the Chicago protest movement. Following the release of the school space 
study report, Urban League representatives joined with representatives 
from CORE and the NAACP, in December, 1961, to testify at the Board of 
Education's budget hearing. All three groups demanded a moratorium on 
new school construction until vacant space had been ut i l ized. 4 4 Then, in 
1962, the League and the NAACP called together representatives of civil 
rights organizations and community organizations to present a united front 
in seeking the nomination of school board members who would be sympa-
thetic to Negro aspirations. By 1963 this informal group had become for-
mally federated as the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations 
(CCCO). The CCCO included in its membership organizations of varying 
degrees of militancy, ranging from the rather conservative Chicago Urban 
League and NAACP to much more militant groups like The Woodlawn 
Organization, CORE and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. 
Nevertheless, the League openly boasted of its role in founding the Coordi-
nating Council. 45 
But, as the civil rights organizations turned more and more to direct 
action and the CCCO assumed a prominent role in leading these projects, 
the League had to define its role clearly. This was as much an internal as 
an external matter. Many Urban League board members had to be con-
vinced that associating with the direct action groups would not result in the 
Urban League Adjustments to the "Negro Revolution" 17 
abandonment of the traditional Urban League methods — research, educa-
tion and negotiation. Berry tried to allay any fears among board members . 
He continually emphasized the importance and the necessity for non-violent 
demonstrations, but he assured them that the League would not become a 
direct participant. He envisioned the agency's relationship to the direct 
action groups as similar to that with business and industrial organiza-
t i ons . 4 6 "As the revolution proceeds, " Berry told his board in late 1963, 
there will be even greater need for [the] Urban League 
with its cracker jack research department, its know-how 
in community organization and negotiation, to provide the 
intelligence to the civil rights movements and the intelli-
gence of the bi-racial process. As the revolution p ro -
ceeds, the Urban League will be needed more and more to 
provide its know-how to the groups who understand how to 
demonstrate — not how to negotiate. 
Urban League abilities will be needed to interpret 
clearly the goals and aspiration — to spell out problems 
and progress to help business and government leaders 
understand the legitimate aims and goals of CORE and 
SNICK; and to help CORE and SNICK understand the prob-
lems of the conventional power s t ruc tu re . 4 7 
There is no evidence that the direct action groups have been willing 
to concede the degree of dependence on the Urban League indicated in this 
statement. Nevertheless, throughout the years 1961 to 1965, the Chicago 
Urban League has maintained the respect and confidence of the more 
aggressive groups. At the same time, it has attracted and held the support 
and goodwill of business and industrial interests. This was no small 
achievement. 
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